Animal Protection Decision Essay

In Why Do Species Matter? , Lilly-Marlene Russow argues that human being permit a moral promise to protect and to ensure the continued existence of things of aestheticalal tax which includes some but not necessarily all animals. In this paper, I will argue that the subjectiveness involved in ascertain aesthetic value turns it an insufficient element for determining moral obligation to the breastplate and preservation of some animals.Russow begins the short letter by separating humanitys obligations toward species from obligations to individual sh ars of a species. This is to drop by the wayside consistency with the disapproval of speciesism. Russow admits that by protecting individual animals we may, as a byproduct, protect some threaten species but segments of the endangered species should be treated no differently than those of a flourishing one. She states that the concept of having interests, as it relates to determining value, cannot be applied to species but rathe r only to individual animals.Russow then uses several try out fictional characters to draw some conclusions close humanitys confusion around what a species really is and what it is rough certain species that we ar trying to preserve or, in some cases, we do not care to preserve. Next, Russow provides objections to three traditional creases for why species do matter. The first is the argument for stewardship which Russow dismisses due to its assumption that species are valuable. The second is the argument for extrinsic value of species regarding their contribution to big picture of life.Russow objects to three different extrinsic value perspectives by 1) stating that we cannot use a species declination as a sign that humans are doing something wrong because that cannot account for unforeseen events, 2) stating that not every species is required for ecological stability, and 3) denying the evolutionary chain argument because extinction and development of species are both part o f evolution. The third argument objected to by Russow is the argument for congenital value. Ironically, Russows main objection to this argument is the same objection that debunks her own argument.What gives intrinsic value? How a lot intrinsic value does something have? Drilling into intrinsic value hike up, Russow objects the biodiversity view claiming if diversity is virtuous than we would be obligated to create as m whatever new species as possible, however useless they may be. She excessively objects to the aesthetic value view of species in that other benefits, such as economic, may override aesthetic value of a species. However, Russow does believe that the aesthetic value view is correct but must be applied more granularly to individual members of species.Russow argues that humans value the aesthetics presented by a single member of a species, not the species itself giving the example of valuing the beauty of a specific Bengal tiger we index interpret but not the specie s Panthera tigris. She also argues that we value the continued existence of individuals like that which sounds very connatural to species. This is odd since the argument for aesthetic value related to species was previously objected by Russow. I argue that aesthetic value is a very subjective concept that is incapable of providing information that would be useful in determining the fate of some animals.Furthermore, aesthetic value is not an appropriate measure for making any relative comparisons to other individuals aesthetic value or other worldly good things or benefits in order to make logical decisions concerning the individuals in question. Much like the case of inherent value, there is not a reliable method for determining what has aesthetic value or not. Russow uses the rarity of encountering a member of a species and the desire to see a member of a species again as possible qualifiers for designate aesthetic value. Other factors include beauty, intriguing environmental ada ptations, and awesomeness.However, not all humans are loss to consider these factors equally when determining aesthetic value of an animal. For instance, using Russows Case 1 as an example, one person may honor the survival techniques of the snail darter enough to protest the edifice of the dam while another person may not care at all about the snail darters existence because they are disgusting and unnecessary. One objection to my argument concerning the subjectivity of aesthetic value may be an appeal to the majority. Opponents may draw a comparison to the case of moral good and evil.A heavy majority of people believe that murder is wrong. Society determines murderers are immoral and governs accordingly. Therefore, if many people find something to be beautiful that a minority finds ugly, the case might be made that the minority is incorrect or somehow lacks the proper aesthetic judgment to make a proper determination of the things value. To tackle this argument, I look no furt her than my own home. My wife is ophidiophobic, i. e. she has an irrational fear of snakes. I on the other hand greatly admire the beauty and intrigue of snakes.If there were a vote to be made on whether to annihilate a rare species of snakes in order to develop the land which they reside, I would most likely vote against. Conversely, my wife would rally supporters and be first in line to vote for eradicating the snakes simply for the fact the snakes would be gone. even out if it was known that these snakes ate some kind of potentially harmful insect that would not matter to her. A 2001 study from Gallup, Inc. suggests up to 50% of Americans may possess a fear of snakes so I find she would not be alone in this decision.We cannot determine who is right or wrong in this situation. I cant say my wife is wrong because no snake will ever have a drop of aesthetic value to her. Meanwhile, to argue against a case for preserving a snake cosmos to aid in eliminating a harmful insect popul ation doesnt seem correct either. This leads keystone to my original objection which is that there is simply too much subjectivity involved in determining aesthetic value for the idea to be relevant in decision making related to the protection of animals.